Whether a State violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by preventing capital litigants from accessing state habeas process with pro bono counsel of choice

Throughout Anthony Wainwright’s under -warrant litigation, his sole objective was to have his substantial claims of constitutional deprivation and error heard by the courts. When he was denied that right due to an arbitrary and flawed process, he sought refuge from the federa l courts under the promise that they would vindicate his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitution. However, in the courts below, Mr. Wainwright was subjected to an overly burdensome dismissal standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12( b)(6). On appeal, and again without notice or opportunity to be heard, the Eleventh Circuit harnessed an arcane and disfavored legal doctrine to evade engaging with his compelling claim that the Florida state courts’ capital postconviction process does not comply with Due Process or Equal Protection. In these last hours before a grave miscarriage of justice, this Court must step in to correct not just the error that has occurred in Mr. Wainwright’s case, but also to prevent the constitutional harms of the defective postconviction process, which would deprive a defendant of his choice of counsel in his most vulnerable time. This Court should provide the opportunity for Mr. Wainwright to finally be heard through a grant of certiorari. The questions presented in this petition are: 1. Whether a State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it mandates that capital litigants have counsel during their state postconviction proceedings, yet precludes them from accessing the state created habeas process with their pro bono counsel of choice? 2. Whether a system that functionally prevents a litigant from presenting claims to the courts with choice of counsel satisfies the right to due process and access to the courts? 3. Whether a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it precludes indigent capital litigants under a death warrant from proceeding with their qualified pro bono counsel of choice , where no prejudice to the State or administration of justice would occur and a non indigent litigant would be entitled to such a choice? 4. Whether a court may justify denying relief by sua sponte raising the Rooker Feldman doctrine, which was found to “probably” apply, to avoid addressing the merits of a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a state’s capital postconviction process governed by statutes and procedural rules? ii LIST OF DIRECTLY