John Fitzgerald Hanson v. Oklahoma
DueProcess HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a court may impose a diligence standard rendering evidence inadmissible despite prosecutorial suppression under Brady v. Maryland, and whether a defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have returned a guilty verdict
(CAPITAL CASE) Mr. Hanson’s juries found him guilty of capital murder, and sentenced him to death, based on the testimony of Rashard Barnes. Barnes testified to Mr. Hanson confessing to the crime, detailing how Hanson said he punched and then and shot an elderly woman , after his co -defendant shot a man who might have seen them . Reviewing the proceedings of Mr. Hanson ’s co-defendant on direct appeal , the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) emphasized that Mr. Hanson’s “confession to Barnes was the most critical evidence in the State’s case.” The trial judge also stressed that “Barnes’ testimony was indeed significant to both guilt and punishment.” The State knew this and relied heavily on Barnes’s testimony in its opening and closing statements at both the guilt and penalty phases. The State also elicited from Barnes testimony that he came forward solely due to the gravity of the crime, and at great personal cost. The State stressed that its case was “true because Rashad said it and everything else corroborates it.” Mr. Hanson’s juries didn’t know that Barnes in fact had cooperated for personal gain—in the form of favorable treatment to his best friend Michael Cole on various criminal charges. Because Barnes passed away long ago, Cole, as well as Barnes’ father, have now come forward to share the truth before Mr. Hanson is executed in spite of the im peachment evidence that the State has long suppressed. From these facts, the following questions are presented: 1) Whether a court may impose a diligence standard rendering any evidence that can be obtained from witnesses per se available via the exercise of reasonable diligence, despite prosecutorial suppression, under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 2) Whether a court may require a defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have returned a guilty verdict to obtain relief for a violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and for Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) .