Whether the Arizona Court of Appeals' decision was 'contrary' to Faretta v. Arizona regarding termination of self-representation rights

I. Whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was “contrary” to Faretta v. Arizona, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), because the state appellate court did not require the trial court to have found that petitioner “deliberately engage[d] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” id. at 834 n.46, before terminating petitioner’s fundamental constitutional right to II. Whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that the trial court did not contravene Faretta v. Arizona, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), by terminating petitioner’s constitutional right to represent himself at trial was based on an unreasonable determination of the relevant facts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). III. Whether, in applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), to petitioner’s Faretta claim, the Ninth Circuit erroneously considered the state trial court’s ruling rather than the Arizona Court of Appeals’ subsequent ruling on direct appeal. IV. Whether, in view of the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous refusal to engage in de novo review of petitioner’s Faretta claim, this Court should remand for the Ninth Circuit to decide whether petitioner “deliberately engage[d] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” so as to have warranted the trial court’s termination of petitioner’s fundamental constitutional right to V. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision that petitioner’s direct appeal counsel’s deficient performance in filing an Anders brief did not “prejudice” petitioner was contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).