Whether, when a district court revokes a term of supervised release and imposes a period of imprisonment followed by a new term of supervised release, the original term of supervised release survives its revocation, contrary to the plain meaning of 'revoke' as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

In Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694 (2000) , this Court, interpreting a since -amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), applied an “unconventional” definition of “ revoke” to find that a revoked term of supervised release “retain[s] some vitality after revocation.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 706– 07. This Court did so in order to allow for the reimposition of supervised release following revocation, “a power not readily apparent from the text of § 3583(e)(3).” Id. at 698. It “depart[ed] from the rule of construction that prefers ordinary meaning” because “the realization of clear Congressional policy (here, favoring the ability to impose supervised release) [was] in tension with the result that customary interpretive rules would deliver.” Id. at 706 n.9. Importantly, t he Court so reasoned against the backdrop of an already -amended § 3583; it had access to a metaphorical crystal ball that made clear how Congress intended the supervised release statute to function. As a result, it “yield[ed] to the Congress of the United States ” and abandoned textualism. Id. But § 3583 has been meaningfully amended in a manner that no longer requires application of an “unconventional” definition of revoke. The language of § 3583(e) (3) itself has changed, and Congress has also added subsection 3583(h), explicitly empowering district courts to impose a new term of supervised release following imprisonment post -revocation. Justice Scalia so recognized when he wrote: “This is not an important case, since it deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to elimi nate, for the future, the issue we today resolve.” Johnson, ii 529 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Problematically, however, multiple courts of appeals, including the Eleventh Circuit, continue applying the old “unconventional” definition of revoke to the new version of § 3583. In so doing, they have held that courts retain jurisdiction to revoke the same term of supervise d release multiple times. Doing so flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of “revoke” and leads to absurd results, such as what occurred here . The question presented is : 1. Whether , when a district court revokes a term of supervised release and imposes a period of imprisonment followed by a new term of supervised release, the original term of supervised release survives its revocation, contrary to the plain meaning of “revoke” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) .