In Miller-El1, this Court held of the relatively low
level of showing necessary from a habeas Petitioner like
Phillip J. Yellin to be entitled to a COA2:
[O]ur opinion in Slack [Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000)] held that a COA does
not require a showing that the appeal will
succeed . Accordingly, a court of appeals should
not decline the application for a COA merely
because it believes the applicant will not
demonstrate an entitlement to relief .
Miller-El, at 337, emphasis added. Therefore, the first
question presented by Mr. Yellin is:

1. Did the Ninth Circuit ignore the process, reemphasized by this Court in Buck v. Davis3
and Miller-El, when it refused to issue a COA
compelled by Yellin's highly specific, corroborated
actual innocence evidence, thereby arbitrarily
demanding of him a more onerous showing
than that long ago established by this Court in
Schlup?4

In Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 82 n.25 (1977),
this Court warned lower courts that in habeas petitions
– "[w]hen the issue is one of credibility, resolution on the
basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive." Therefore,
the second question presented by Yellin is:

2. Given that this Court in Blackledge specifically
warned lower courts against making a credibility
- "resolution on the basis of affidavits"- did the
Ninth Circuit sanction a violation of Blackledge by
approving a district court's improper credibility
determinations on Yellin's uncontradicted habeas
declarations alone?

Did the Ninth Circuit ignore the Supreme Court's established process for issuing a Certificate of Appealability by refusing to issue a COA based on Yellin's actual innocence evidence?