Bernice M. Rutland v. Regions Bank, as Trustee of the William Hunter Rutland Family Trust
DueProcess Immigration Privacy
Whether a Chancery Judge has jurisdiction to modify a final divorce order thirteen years after the original ruling, without a Rule 59 motion or appeal, and whether the Chancery Court abused its discretion in denying depositions and granting summary judgment
This case presents one of first impression and of national importance and significance because it conflicts with well-established rules and principles and conflicts with this Court and other federal and state courts. The Federal Rules of Evidence 201(e) and M.R.C.P. 201(e) both allow the party affected by taken Judicial Notice the Opportunity to be Heard, and Rule 56 Sum mary Judgement requires the moving party to meet its burden of production. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 333 (1986) and The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process clause. The case below has questions of first impression. 1. Whether a Chancery Judge has jurisdiction or authority to change the Final Order of another Chancery Judge, thirteen (13) years after the order was signed by both parties, their attorneys and the Chancery Judge in the divorce hearing, where there was no Rule 59 motion to amend and was never appealed and both parties were deceased. 2. Whether the Chancery Court abused its discre tion by denying defendants request for deposition of three (3) key witnesses, limiting Rule 56(f) relief to only producing relevant documents, preventing defend ant from putting on a complete defense, then taking Judicial Notice, and doing its own research to reach a conclusion of law when reconsidering a dispositive motion and granting summary judgement to plaintiff, denying defendant Rule 201(e) Opportunity to be Heard, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend ment.