Whether the Supreme Court should overturn the actual-malice standard for public figure defamation plaintiffs and whether applying this standard in anti-SLAPP cases violates the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ,1 this Court “overturn[ed] 200 years of libel law” to constitutionalize an actual-malice standard for public-official defamation plaintiffs.2 This Court extended this actual-malice innovation to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts .3 Compelled by this Court’s constitutional decisions in Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co. , States, like Nevada, have incorporated the actual-malice standard into their anti-SLAPP statutes. As a result, those States require public figure plaintiffs to prove the merits of their case— including actual malice—before any discovery occurs (or with only “limited” discovery). State courts are split over the application of the actual-malice standard’s clear and convincing evidence burden to public figure plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP cases and whether it violates a plaintiff’s right to a civil jury trial. These are the questions presented: 1. Whether this Court should overturn Sullivan ’s actual-malice standard or, at a minimum, overrule Curtis Publishing Co. ’s expansion of it to public figures. 1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 3. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). ii 2. Should this Court decline to overturn or otherwise cabin Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co. , whether the Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil jury trial is incorporated against the States and, if yes, whether the application of the actual-malice standard at the early anti-SLAPP stage of litigation violates a plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial.