Whether the ESA's preemption provision protects all activities enjoying an exception under the ESA, even if self-executing, or only those activities authorized by an individualized administrative exception

Petitioners are trade associations whose members include respected antique and art galleries in New York. They sell prized antiques and works of art that contain ivory and rhinoceros horn —products whose sale is expressly authorized by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and its implementing regulations. In 2014, New York enacted its State Ivory Law, which bans Petitioners’ members from selling their inventories of antique ivory and horn articles in New York. Petitioners challenged the law as preempted by the ESA, which expressly preempts state laws that “prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for in [the ESA] or in any regulation which implements [the ESA].” 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f). The Second Circuit panel held, over a dissent by Judge Sullivan, that only individualized administrative except ions trigger the statute’s preemption provision. Because the sale of antique s and art containing ivory and horn is allowed under broad , selfexecuting exceptions to the ESA’s otherwise applicable prohibitions on commerce , the panel majority therefore held that New York’s Ivory Law is not preempted. The question presented is whether the ESA’s preemption provision protects all activities enjoying an exception under the ESA, even if selfexecuting , or instead only those activities authorized by an individualized administrative exception .