Patrick Comack v. Leland Dudek, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
SocialSecurity DueProcess FifthAmendment Patent
Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit violate Supreme Court precedent by using a three-part test instead of the two-part Mathews v. Eldridge test for waiving administrative exhaustion in a Social Security disability case?
I. Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit (“Appeals Court ”) violate Supreme Court case precedent when it arbitrarily used a three-part test to decide whether the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida Key West Division (“District Court ”) could waive administrative exhaustion of remedies (“administrative exhaustion ”) for jurisdiction in a 42 United States Code (“U.S.C. ”) §405 (g) Social Security Administration (“SSA ”) disability case when Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976) established the two-part “Mathews v. Eldridge test ” for the District Courts to use when deciding whether to waive administrative exhaustion for 42 U.S.C. §405 (g) jurisdiction? II. Was the Appeals Court correct when it ignored Patrick Comack ’s (“Comack ’s”) claim, which was collateral to Comack ’s claim for disability benefits, that the SSA Commissioner (“Commissioner ”) violated Comack ’s constitutional right to fair due process as dictated by the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when the Commissioner and her Miami SSA office forged and fabricated Comack ’s wage evidence in the SSA disability administrative review process, and then used this false evidence in the Commissioner ’s June 10, 2021 Second Remand Order in order to unlawfully remand Comack ’s disability case back to the same Miami SSA office who manufactured the false evidence? i ■ft**: III. Did Comack meet the two-part Mathews v. Eldridge test in Mathews u. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976) in order for the District Court to waive administrative exhaustion for jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405 (g) in Comack ’s disability case? IV. Was the Appeals Court correct to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP ”) 4(m) “good cause ” statute when determining whether the District Court should have granted Comack an extension of time to cure his alleged service deficiency? ■ / u ■'"tH r.■'tt