Whether the failure to rule on judicial recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) constitutes a due process violation when a judge's spouse has financial ties to a party in litigation

28 U.S.C. § 455 outlines the grounds for disqual ification of judges and magistrates due to potential biases or conflicts of interest. This Honorable Court has previously highlighted the fact that: “We must first determine whether § 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality. ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 858 (1988) . This Court has also highlighted the fact that “failure to consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process. ” Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) . This unique case raises three questions under that well -established framework: 1. Should the merits as to the question of recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) be decided first, before reaching the merits of any potential abuse of discretion in excluding evidence in the district court? 2. Is the failure to rule on the merits under § 455(a) a due process violation, especially when the spouse of the district court judge has accepted $700 Million in part from Google (which is a party to ongoing litigation), and has five publicly -announced strategic partnerships with Google? 3. Should federal judges be allowed to hold invest ments of $5 Million and as much as a $25 Million in hedge funds under 28 U.S.C. § 455(d) ?