Whether the inaccurate advice by a criminal defendant's attorney to reject a favorable plea agreement during plea negotiations, with the prosecutor's contemporaneous awareness, deprives the defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel

In Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 (2012), this Court underscored what it then saw as important differences between the plea-bargaining issues raised in Hill1 and Padilla2—on one hand—and the unique issue later raised in Frye —on the other—by noting the flux inherent in the pleabargaining process where a defendant rejects a plea offer: When a plea offer has . . . been rejected , however, no formal court proceedings are involved. This underscores that the plea-bargaining process is often in flux, with no clear standards or timelines and with no judicial supervision of the discussions between prosecution and defense . Indeed, discussions between client and defense counsel are privileged. So the prosecution has little or no notice if something may be amiss and perhaps no capacity to intervene in any event . Frye at 143, emphasis added. Because Elvin Torres-Estrada (Mr. Torres-Estrada) presents unique, undisputed facts and a novel Frye scenario, the issue he presents is therefore: 1. Whether the inaccurate advice by Mr. TorresEstrada’s rogue attorney to reject a favorable plea agreement during plea negotiations, with the prosecutor’s contemporaneous awareness, deprived Torres-Estrada of his right to the effective assistance of counsel just as in Lafler v. Cooper ?3 1. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 2. Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 3. 566 U.S. 134 (2012).