Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from executing a defendant whose diminished moral culpability due to service-related traumatic brain injury and Gulf War Illness was not adequately considered at sentencing, and whether state courts may summarily deny postconviction relief without addressing newly discovered evidence of such diminished culpability

No question identified. : his personal moral culpability was diminished by the profound impact of physical and psychological wounds he sustained on the front lines of the Gulf War. Not only does the petition raise issues worthy of certiorari, but this Court should not tolerate the State’s attempt to evade constitutional review of a death sentence by interrupting active and likely meritorious litigation with an execution date. I. Background! On January 15, 2025, Mr. Hutchinson filed a successive motion for state postconviction relief from his 2001 Florida death sentences. Mr. Hutchinson alleged that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that his death sentences violated the Eighth Amendment, due to his diminished moral culpability attributable to the cumulative neurocognitive impact of injuries he suffered on the front lines of the Gulf War. PCR4 152-309. Although Mr. Hutchinson had attempted to present Gulf War Illness as a mitigating factor at the time of trial, the lack of scientific understanding regarding the condition led to misconceptions about its impact and an improper weighing process at sentencing. PCR4 299-300. Additionally, Mr. Hutchinson presented evidence that his personal culpability was further lessened due to profound 1 Citations are as follows: “R.” refers to the first eighteen volumes of the record on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court (SC01-500). “T.” refers to the separately paginated trial transcript in volumes nineteen through thirty-two of the record on appeal. “PCR1” refers to the record on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court from the initial state postconviction appeal (SC08-99); “PCR2” to the record on appeal from the successive state postconviction appeal (SC17-1229); “PCR3” to the record on appeal from the second successive postconviction appeal (SC21-18); and “PCR4” to the record on appeal from this appeal (SC25-0497). Other references are self-explanatory. brain damage from a newly recognized form of traumatic brain injury related to his military service. PCR 227-30. At a March 6, 2025, case management conference related to Mr. Hutchinson’s motion, Judge Oberliesen indicated he needed additional time to review the underlying record and evaluate the need for an evidentiary hearing. PCR4 346-47, 646, 853. On March 31, 2025, before Judge Oberliesen had time to conduct the necessary review, Governor Ron DeSantis signed Mr. Hutchinson’s death warrant. PCR4 671-72. The next day, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Lacey Powell Clark. PCR4 711. Three days later—a full week before the deadline imposed by the Florida Supreme Court’s expedited warrant schedule—the pending motion was summarily denied on timeliness grounds. PCR4 1080-1116. Mr. Hutchinson’s motion for rehearing was denied on April 8, 2025. PCR4 1164-79, 1185-91. Mr. Hutchinson appealed to the Florida Supreme Court on April 9, 2025, and was given a single day in which to file his initial brief. On April 21, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order. Pet. App. Al. Although the summary nature of the circuit court’s denial meant the Florida Supreme Court had a duty to construe in Mr. Hutchinson’s favor all disputed factual issues, the court instead made unfavorable factual assumptions against him. Pet. App. Al at 8-9. Concurrently with this stay application, Mr. Hutchinson has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. II. The stay factors weigh in favor of granting a stay This Court is empowered to stay an execution pending consideration and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari because “[a]pproving the execution of a defendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would clearly be improper.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983). The standards for granting a stay are well established. See id. at 895; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). While Mr. Hutchinson recognizes that a stay of execution is “an equitable remedy” and is “not available as a matter of right,” Hill, 547 U