Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes temporal or procedural limits on the government's authority to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or whether such detention may continue indefinitely so long as removal proceedings remain pending

No question identified. : To the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit: Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.3, Nyynkpao Banyee (“Applicant” or “Mr. Banyee”) respectfully requests an extension of 60 days to and including August 15, 2025, of the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this matter. In support of this request, counsel state as follows: 1. Mr. Banyee, a noncitizen whom the government seeks to remove from the United States, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to challenge his prolonged detention without a hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which authorizes mandatory detention pending removal proceedings for certain noncitizens. The district court held that the government violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in detaining Mr. Banyee for over 12 months without an individualized custody hearing and ordered a bond hearing in immigration court with the burden on the government to justify the need for continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. See Nyynkpao B. v. Garland, No. 21-CV-1817 (WMW/BRT), 2022 WL 1115452, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2022). 2. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion dated September 17, 2024. The decision is available at Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024), as well as in the attached Addendum (Add. 18A—26A). 3. The Eighth Circuit denied Mr. Banyee’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on March 18, 2025, making the current deadline to submit a petition for certiorari June 16, 2025, by operation of Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 and 30.1. A copy of the order is in the attached Addendum (Add. 1A—15A). 4. This application is timely submitted more than ten days prior to the current filing deadline. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. 5. For reasons set forth below, Applicant’s counsel respectfully request a 60-day extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case. 6. The decision below presents both a circuit split and an issue of nationwide importance. The Eighth Circuit erroneously held that the Due Process Clause “imposes no time limit on detention pending deportation,” and that the government may detain an individual for any amount of time so long as removal proceedings are still “pending” and “deportation remains a possibility.” Add. 19A, 25A. The Eighth Circuit’s decision is based upon a misreading of this Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Add. 21A—24A. In holding categorically that prolonged detention does not present any due process issue, the Eighth Circuit has broken with all the other circuits that have decided this issue. See Black v. Decker,103 F.4th 133, 159 (2d Cir. 2024); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 2038, 210 (8d Cir. 2020); see also Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2021). 7. In addition to splitting with the First, Second, and Third Circuits on that question, the Eighth Circuit relied on a misreading of this Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, which rejected a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) while noting repeatedly that the Due Process Clause permits mandatory detention only for a “brief” and “limited period” necessary for removal proceedings. See 538 U.S. at 513, 526. The decision below also conflicts with other precedents of this Court requiring adequate procedural protections to ensure that civil detention, including immigration detention, serves a valid governmental purpose. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 8. Mr. Banyee thus sought rehearing and rehearing en banc. However, while his petition was pending before the Eighth Circuit, Mr. Banyee received an administratively final order of r