Whether a federal district court may use its inherent equitable powers to approve a negotiated fishing decree that diminishes a tribal nation's treaty-protected rights without full adjudication and over the tribe's express objections

in this case are exceptionally important because they deal directly with treaty critical fishing rights reserved to the Sault Tribe through the Treaty of 1836, under which the Sault Tribe’s predecessors ceded to the United States millions of acres of land in present-day Michigan. More than 50 years ago, the United States filed this action—in which the Sault Tribe intervened—to protect these reserved rights against interference by the State of Michigan, and in 1979, the district court entered a decree protecting the rights of the Sault Tribe to fish in treaty waters. In the ensuing decades, during which time the district court retained jurisdiction, the Sault Tribe and several other successors in interest to the original Treaty of 1836 have periodically negotiated new decrees to account for the dynamic nature of this shared resource and the changing needs of its users. As the latest decree was set to expire, however, the Sault Tribe was excluded from negotiations. The resulting decree—entered by the district court over the Sault Tribe’s the Sault Tribe’s rights under the Treaty of 1836. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless affirmed, holding that the district court acted within its inherent equitable powers when it approved a negotiated resolution that disposes of a sovereign tribal government’s constitutionally protected treaty rights, without a full adjudication and over that tribal government’s express opposition. This erroneous holding has far-reaching implications. If tribal nations and state governments can collude to deprive another tribal nation of its treaty rights, the consequences are significant. The decision risks upending the ability of sovereign tribal nations to meaningfully and effectively protect their treaty resources. It perpetuates a dynamic where the federal trustee can elevate a specific tribe’s treaty rights over another tribe’s treaty rights when resolving disputes over a shared resource, all in the name of judicial efficiency. This may render ineffective the critical importance of the treaties negotiated and signed between the United States and tribal nations. 3. In August 2022, over the repeated objections and protests of the Sault Tribe, the other six parties to these proceedings excluded the Sault Tribe from all further negotiations on what would ultimately become the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree. The parties took the next three months to negotiate without the Sault Tribe, a necessary party, and filed their proposed decree on December 11, 2022. In response, the Sault Tribe requested a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 planning conference to schedule the matter for trial. The district court denied that request and only permitted the Sault Tribe to file written objections to the proposed decree. App. B at 7-8. 4. On May 24, 2023, the district court held a two-day hearing on the filed objections where it declined to consider expert testimony, permitting only oral argument by counsel. The district court then approved the proposed decree and entered the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree on August 24, 2023. The Sault Tribe timely appealed, and the Sixth Circuit entered its decision affirming the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree on March 13, 2025. See App. B. 5. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order based on a series of holdings that raise immensely important issues related to treaty rights and tribal sovereignty. First, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court had “inherent equitable power” to allocate the treaty waters in a manner that infringed the Sault Tribe’s treaty protected fishing rights over the Sault Tribe’s express objections. App. B at 10-16. Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court could bind the Sault Tribe to the resolution negotiated without its participation and over its objections without finding that the proponents of the resolution had met the standard for injunctive relief. App. B at 16-19. Third, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court coul