Whether the doctrine of issue preclusion impermissibly bars enforcement of an arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act when a prior judicial determination involves related contract claims

(1) Whether the doctrine of preclusion overrides the equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.? INTRODUCTION Pursuant to Sup. Ct. Rule 13.5 Sergei Vinkov ("Vinkov") submits his application to Associate Justice Hon. Elena Kagan for relief in the form of an extension of a 34-day extension period, up to and including Monday, September 15, 2025 (33rd day falls on Sunday), within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case. Petitioner estimated the current jurisdictional deadline pursuant to 28 USC § 1257 and § 1254(1) as Tuesday, August 12, 2025 prompted by the discretional denial of review on 05/14/2025 within California Supreme Court (App. I). This application complies with Rules 13.5 and 30.2 as it is being filed 10 days or more before the petition is due. In support of a good cause appearance, the Applicant alleges the following: 1. Additional time is necessary to conduct retrospective research on jurisprudence of this Court to articulate the reasons for interventions of the highest court into lower proceedings and develop the arguments in the light of new authorities on the related subject. Petitioner anticipates to ask this Court to exam whether the doctrine of preclusion overrides the equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The four essential elements to decide if issue preclusion applies are: 1) the former judgment must be valid and final; 2) the same issue is being brought; 3) the issue is essential to the judgement; 4) the issue was actually litigated. Petitioner previously appeared before this Court to contest the validity of the declaratory judgment in favor of insurance company under the Establishment and Case and Controversy Clauses (22-1032). Those questions are still to be open and not settled by this Court and it appear those recurring issues should be properly to brief on the merits stage in the discussion of jurisdictional limits of collateral estoppel application to arbitration enforcement proceedings. Now, Petitioner relies on the federal constitutional mandate coming from the Supremacy Clause which does not allow to restrict his ability to enforce arbitration against Insurer on the ground of issues of preclusion. “It is unfair for a signatory to an ... agreement to avoid arbitration by suing nonsignatories for claims that are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims deriving from the agreement.” Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC, No. B328959, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. Dee. 3, 2024). A former Justice Chin, from California Supreme Court, dissenting decades ago, indicated that denial of enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms frustrates the public policy (Broughton v. Cigna Health plans, 21 Cal4th 1066 (1999)). Moreover, “the denial of the parties' right to their agreed-upon decision maker is thus the sort of miscarriage of justice that requires reversal without further harmless error analysis.” (Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 1 Cal.5th 233, 261 (Cal. 2016)). State statutory language supports Petitioner’s position because 153 years ago, the California Legislature declared, “For every wrong there is a remedy.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 3523) and Cal. Civ. Code § 3517 provides: "InJo one can take advantage of his own wrong." It appears that intervention of this Court is needed to articulate properly reasons to combat judicial hostility to arbitration within California courts. “This Court often reminds other judges that if one of our precedents “has direct application in a case,” they must follow it, even if they dislike it“leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989).” (Kagan dissent, in Trump v Wilcox 605 U.S. (2025), slip at 4). The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, mandates that the FAA preempts state dec