Whether the Due Process Clause requires meaningful predeprivation notice of government property seizure when alternative notification methods are technologically available

No question identified. : Procedural Background 1. Petitioner filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, asserting a violation of his procedural due-process rights on account of the failure of Respondent — the City of Portland, Oregon — to attempt to notify him of an impending government deprivation of his property rights in his vehicle (i.e., via an involuntary tow and impoundment). Except via paper posting made in a location Petitioner was not (and where Respondent knew Petitioner was not), Respondent made no other predeprivation attempts to notify Petitioner of the deprivation before the involuntary tow and impoundment of the vehicle. 2. Under longstanding precedent, sole reliance upon paper posting is not a Constitutionally adequate method of attempting notice where alternatives are available, including in the context of a tow as both the D.C. Circuit and other courts have held. Notably, Petitioner was a registered user of Respondent’s own smartphone parking app and, in fact, Respondent was in communication with Petitioner via that app, using it to send him notifications about his car — just not about the tow. 3. Initially, the District Court dismissed the case under the familiar Mathews test. See generally Grimm v. City of Portland, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63656 (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2018) (Mosman, J.). During the first appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding inter alia that the District Court had applied the incorrect legal test because this Honorable Court’s Mullane test, not the Mathews test, governs the sufficiency of the method used to attempt notice. Grimm v. City of Portland, 971 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2020) (Berzon, J.). 4. On remand, the District Court re-entered summary judgment. App.B, infra. A different panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. App.A, infra. The Ninth Circuit purported to narrow this Honorable Court’s precedents governing how notice must be provided (Mennonite) and also entirely overlooked an important case regarding the use of paper posting (Greene). 5. Petitioner sought rehearing. App.C, infra. In the petition for rehearing below, Petitioner again emphasized the authorities of this Honorable Court that were overlooked by the Ninth Circuit panel below. The Ninth Circuit neither granted rehearing nor amended its opinion to address those authorities in any respect despite their citation — and Petition submits meaningful emphasis — in the merits briefing and petition for rehearing. 6. Petitioner intends to petition this Honorable Court for review. Reasons for Granting an Extension of Time 7. Several reasons establish good cause and justify an extension of time to petition for cert. 8. The principal reason for an extension is that the undersigned counsel is presently on paternity leave and caring for his first-born child who was born in late April. The undersigned is a primary caretaker and is also caring for and supporting his wife, both during the period of her pregnancy and providing substantial support to her after their son was born. Caring for a newborn is an incredibly demanding endeavor and presents the principal reason for extension. 9. Moreover, even after his paternity leave, the undersigned will need to prepare the cert petition, which, done well, is a substantial undertaking. For example, the undersigned plans to review the development of the Mullane case law carefully, as part of preparing the cert petition, which will entail substantial research in the case authorities. 10. Furthermore, there’s a fair prospect that this Court would grant certiorari, given the Circuit conflict with the D.C. Circuit, the purported narrowing of the Mennonite case, and the refusal to consider the Greene case — presenting numerous grounds for granting a cert petition. The case also implicates important questions related to how Constitutional rights to notice interface with technology and instantaneous communications. See Taylor v. Yee, 577 U.S. 1178, 1179 (2016) (ALITO, J., join