Whether the Supreme Court should clarify the proper application of pleading standards under Rule 8 and the McDonnell Douglas framework in employment discrimination cases, particularly at the motion to dismiss stage

No question identified. : TO THE HONORABLE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Pursuant to Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.1 of this Court, Applicant Anthony Ntamere respectfully applies for a 60-day extension of time to and including August 30, 2025, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case. The court of appeals denied Applicant's petition for rehearing en banc on April 2, 2025. App.la. Unless extended, the time for filing any petition for a writ of certiorari will expire on July 1, 2025. The last day to have filed an application for an extension of time would have been June 21, 2025, a Saturday, allowing an extension to Monday. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The petition will challenge the summary dismissal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Administrator, Inc, not reported but a copy of the judgment is attached. App.3a. 1 Due to circumstances beyond my control, I cannot meet the July 1, 2025 deadline. My research annotations were lost when Casetext, which I relied upon since September 2022, was acquired by Thomson Reuters and access was discontinued on March 31, 2025. Although I downloaded citations, this was insufficient to preserve my annotated research, which I must now reconstruct. 2 My case involves what I believe is clear abuse of appellate discretion under Circuit Rule 47A(a), which permits dismissal with only a boilerplate statement. Both the magistrate and district judges misapplied established law, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, particularly regarding the improper use of prima facie case requirements at the pleading stage. Despite the district judge's awareness of these legal standards in other cases!, defendants' motion to dismiss was erroneously granted before any responsive pleading was filed. 3 The Eighth Circuit panel's summary dismissal contravenes clearly established Supreme Court precedent under Swierkiewicz v. Soremal N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), which (a) prohibits requiring prima facie pleading under the McDonnell Douglas Framework analysis as an impermissible heightened pleading standard under Rule 8; (b) that confirms neither Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), nor Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), overruled or modified Swierkiewicz's central holding that requiring McDonnell’s prima facie pleading violates Rule 8's notice pleading regime---a holding explicitly undisturbed by any subsequent Supreme Court rulings; and (c) establishes that direct evidence of when properly alleged, obviates the need for McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis at any stage of the proceedings, including pleading. 4 The MDHR appeal finding introduced three case laws that became the foundation for defeating my cause of action under Title VII and § 1981. I clearly 1 Judge Menendez's application of the McDonnell Douglas Framework at the pleading stage contradicts her established practice. Reviewing other cases she presided over reveals the proper application of the framework. The necessity to examine all such cases arises to determine if the ruling was obligatory, capricious, or intentional. The deviation enabled dismissal with prejudice, creating a preclusion effect under Rule 12(b)(2). Ramirez-Cruz v. Chipotle Servs., LLC, Civil No. 15-4514 ADM/KMM (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2017); + Benner v. St. Paul Pub. Sch., 380 F. Supp. 3d 869 (D. Minn. 2019); Darmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 611 F. Supp. 3d 726 (D. Minn. 2020); Jackson v. Minn. Dep't of Human Serve., 20-cv-749 (KMM/TNL) (D. Minn. July 31, 2024) explained to the Eighth Circuit that none of these cases applied: (1) I have no fiduciary obligation like the appellant in Gogel v. Kia, which was why "soliciting other employees to file discrimination charges" was deemed unreasonable conduct unworth