Whether the federal crime of larceny under 18 U.S.C. § 661 requires proof that the defendant took property with the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of it for the defendant's own use or benefit, or whether proof of knowing deprivation of property alone satisfies the 'intent to steal or purloin' element

No question identified. : Petitioners were two shark-diving instructors in Jupiter, Florida. Upon returning from a successful outing one day, they discovered a fishing line attached to a buoy in the middle of the ocean. Attached to the line were dying sharks and other marine life. Believing that this line was an illegal shark-killing operation, they and their passengers spent the next few hours pulling in the line and cutting off the hooks and sharks caught on them. During that time, they were repeatedly in contact with law enforcement. As it turned out, the fishing line had received a rare NOAA permit. But there were no official markings alerting anyone to this. Rather than simply have petitioners pay for the $3,000 in property damage caused by their good-faith mistake, the government charged them with one count of taking property, “with intent to steal or purloin,” in the special maritime jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661. This is a felony larceny offense carrying up to five years in prison. With great reluctance, a jury found petitioners guilty. The reason for that unjust outcome is that the district court instructed the jury that petitioners had the requisite “intent to steal or purloin” as long as they knowingly deprived someone else of their property. The court rejected petitioners request to instruct the jury that the government also had to prove that they took the property for the use or benefit of themselves or anyone else. Petitioners reiterated that argument on appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit rejected it in a published opinion, declining to apply this Court’s precedent narrowly interpreting the reach of federal criminal statutes. Judge Lagoa, joined by Judge Grant, issued a remarkable concurring opinion forcefully criticizing the government’s decision to charge petitioners and calling out the federal prosecutor by name. Although petitioners were sentenced to one year of probation, they had no prior criminal records. As a result of this case, they are now branded convicted felons. Undersigned counsel will not have sufficient time to prepare and file the certiorari petition by the current deadline due to the press of other business, including pending appeals in both the Eleventh Circuit (e.g., United States v. Brian Bocage, 11th Cir. No. 24-12275, United States v. Ott, 11th Cir. No. 24-13812, United States v. Bruno, 11th Cir. No. 22-13277, United States v. Schmitz, 11th Cir. No. 2411157, and United States v. Spearman, 11th Cir. No. 24-10300), and in this Court (e.g., Bowe v. United States, U.S. No. 24-5438 (cert. granted Jan. 17, 2025)). Undersigned counsel believes that additional time is important to ensure the effective representation of petitioners. No party will be prejudiced by the granting of a 30-day extension of time. Accordingly, petitioners respectfully requests that an order be entered extending their time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari by 30 days—extending the current deadline from April 23, 2025, to May 23, 2025. Respectfully submitted, ASHLEY M. LITWIN HECTOR A. DOPICO SEITLES & LITWIN, P.A. FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 40 N.W. 3rd St. PH 1 ANDREW L. ADLER Miami, FL 33128 /s/ Andrew L. Adler (305) 403-8070 Counsel of Record ASS’T FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 1E. Broward Blvd., Suite 1100 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-7436 Andrew_Adler@fd.org March 24th, 2025