Jessica Pitts, Officer, et al. v. Taylor Burke, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Thomas Gay, Deceased
Despite this Court's repeated interventions—
including its unanimous decision in City of Tahlequah
v. Bond , 142 S.Ct. 9 (2021)—emphasizing that clearly
established law must be particularized and must squarely
govern the specific circumstances confronting the officer,
the court of appeals denied qualified immunity by defining
clearly established law at a high level of generality and
relied on a circuit specific escalation theory, generalized
excessive force principles and materially distinguishable
precedent.
The decision also reflects ongoing confusion regarding
the role of pre-seizure conduct in the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness and clearly established law inquiries
after Barnes v. Felix , 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025), as well
as instability in the application of summary judgment
principles in qualified immunity cases. Although objective
forensic evidence in the record—including the medical
examiner's conclusion that the decedent was shot from
the front—underscores the rapidly evolving and uncertain
nature of the encounter, the court of appeals nevertheless
permitted the claim to proceed based on retrospective
reconstruction of the officers' tactical decisions and threat
perception.
This case can be resolved without revisiting any
factual disputes because, even accepting the facts assumed
below, Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity. The
petition therefore presents the following questions:
1. Whether a court of appeals may deny qualified
immunity by treating a circuit specific "reckless creation"
or escalation theory as clearly established Fourth
Amendment law, notwithstanding this Court's express
reservation in Barnes and the absence of any decision of
this Court or robust consensus of persuasive authority that
squarely governs the specific circumstances confronting
the officer.
2. Whether clearly established law may be defined
at a high level of generality by relying on generalized
excessive-force principles and materially distinguishable
precedents, rather than precedent that places the
constitutional question beyond debate in the particular
circumstances confronting the officer.
3. Whether a court of appeals may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory qualified
immunity appeal by characterizing legal issues as factual
disputes, even where the district court has identified the
facts assumed for purposes of summary judgment.
Whether a court of appeals may deny qualified immunity by applying a circuit-specific escalation theory and defining clearly established law at a high level of generality rather than requiring precedent that squarely governs the specific circumstances confronting the officer, and whether pre-seizure conduct factors into Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis after Barnes v. Felix