1. The Ninth Circuit has long held that sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 "must be supported by a finding of subjective bad faith," and that bad faith may be inferred only when a filing is "so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that it must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay." In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436–37 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit has further held that an attorney's reliance on new, client provided information not previously considered by the district court, even in support of a frivolous position, may be negligent but does not constitute sanctionable bad faith under § 1927. Caputo v. Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., 96 F.4th 1, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2024).

The Federal Circuit has recognized that regional circuit law governs § 1927 in patent cases. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., 66 F.4th 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Yet in this Ninth Circuit case it affirmed § 1927 sanctions without any express finding of subjective bad faith, applying instead an "objective" standard derived from its own precedent, Julien v. Zeringue, 864 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Whether, in a case arising from the Ninth Circuit, a federal court of appeals may affirm sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 based on an "objective" recklessness standard and without an express finding of subjective bad faith, notwithstanding Ninth Circuit precedent requiring such a finding.

2. Here, the district court sanctioned petitioner's counsel under § 1927 solely for filing and maintaining a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a fee award under 35 U.S.C. § 285. The motion was supported by sworn declarations from the client's president and engineer, setting out pre suit investigation facts not previously before the court. Appx0512–Appx0513; Appx0514–Appx0516; see Appx0504–Appx0509. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Caputo held that similar reliance on new client information does not amount to bad faith for § 1927 purposes. 96 F.4th at 1156–57. The Federal Circuit nonetheless affirmed § 1927 sanctions here, reasoning that counsel "could have avoided sanction by simply not filing such a motion," and that refraining from filing "would not by any means have constituted abandonment of their client." Appx0004–Appx0005; EscapeX IP, LLC v. Google LLC, 2025 WL 3274847, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2025).

Whether an attorney's good faith effort to challenge a fee award by filing a Rule 59(e) motion supported by client declarations not previously considered by the district court constitutes "vexatious" multiplication of proceedings sanctionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, in a

Whether a federal court of appeals may affirm sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 based on an objective recklessness standard without an express finding of subjective bad faith, notwithstanding Ninth Circuit precedent requiring such a finding, and whether an attorney's good faith effort to challenge a fee award by filing a Rule 59(e) motion supported by client declarations constitutes sanctionable vexatious multiplication of proceedings