Whether a federal court overseeing an equity receivership has equitable authority to dispose of claims that belong to a third-party against non receivership entities without the claimants' consent

As discussed in a nearly -identical, unopposed petition (24-1192), t he extent to which f ederal courts can exert powe r over third -party claims and claimants is a question of national significan ce that has arisen with increasing frequency in a vari ety of contexts. This Cou rt has itself curtailed multipl e courts’ attempts to exer cise authority over objecting parties or non -parties t he last two terms . Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S.Ct. 2540 (2025) ( courts can award complete equitable relief only to parties ); Texas v. New Mexico , 602 U.S. 943 (2024) (settling parties cannot dispose o f non-settling objectior ’s claims ); Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. , 603 U.S. 204 (2024) (bankruptcy code does not permit nonconsensual release of third -party claims ). Five circuits have also issued conflicting decisions on courts’ equitable authority over third party claims, but in the equitable receivership arena —when court s appoint receivers in SEC enforcement actions to manage distressed debtors ’ assets , then oversee their division among creditors. The Fifth , Tenth, Eleventh, and now the Ninth Circuit permit federal receivership court s to approve a receiver’s settlement with a non-receivership entity that enjoins third-party claims against that entity without the claimants’ consent. But the Sixth Circuit forbi ds the nonconsensual release of claims that belong to a third party in the name of equity . The question thus presented , and ripe for rev iew, is: Whether a federal court overseeing an equity receivership has equitable authority to dispose of claims that belong to a third -party against non receivership entities without the claimants’ consent.