Whether a sworn denial of receipt creates a triable question of fact that rebuts the presumption of receipt under the federal common law mailbox rule

In 2021, Petitioner discov ered that New York City had issued him a notice of violation in 2015. When he filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying penalty, the City invoked the federal common law mailbox rule to argue that the courts must presume that the City mailed the notice in 2015, and that Petitioner received it then, making the lawsuit untimely. The mailbox rule presumes that a letter placed in the mail is promptly receiv ed. To trigger the presumption, the mailer provides evidence that he placed the letter in the mail. The burden then shifts to the addressee to rebut the presumption of receipt. Most circuits that have considered the issue hold that an addressee’s sworn denial of rece ipt is sufficient to rebut the presumption and create a triable issue of fact. The Second Circuit, by contrast, holds that a sworn denial alone is insufficient rebuttal evidence. Unlike other circuits, the Second Circuit requires an addressee to produce other evidence of that rarely exists. In addition to splitting with its sister circuits, the Second Circuit’s approach is also at odds with the way evidentiary presumptions work under this Court’s precedent and Federal Rule of Evidence 301. The Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with these federal authorities be cause it derives from a state-law rule, not a federal standard. The question presented is whether, under the mailbox rule, a sworn denial of receipt creates a triable question of fact that rebuts the presumption of receipt.