Whether using pseudonyms for parents and children in sensitive cases is appropriate and outweighs the presumption of public access, and whether children have the right to be represented by pro se non-attorney parents in their claims

It is bedrock law that the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise ” the jurisdiction they possess. Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 150 (2015). Lack of adherence to that obligation has plagued this petitioner through state and federal courts adversely impacting petitioner, petitioner ’s child, petitioner ’s family, and those similarly situated in compounding fashion. This Court, while recognizing the use of pseudonyms in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), et cetera, has yet to give clear directions as to its proper applications — pertinently given the current age of online court records, search engines, and children ’s privacy. This Court has recognized privacy rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Inter alia, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 and 17; statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §3509(d); and Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2003)) (restricting collection, use, and disclosure of children ’s personal information by websites); and juvenile offender protections aim to safeguard children ’s privacy. Therefore, the questions presented are: • Whether using pseudonyms for parents and children —in cases involving children, especially with sensitive information —is appropriate and outweighs the presumption of public right of access, as held by the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, or is possible and must be considered and weighed fully, including denial ’s adverse effect on meritorious ii claims (e.g. silencing, or degrading pro se cases, even on further review) beyond general anonymity disapproval, as the Fourth Circuit held, and be applies to adult children ’s sensitive childhood information, as the Fifth Circuit has retroactively allowed; or whether such information and children must be disclosed, as held by districts in the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, despite intra-circuit protections for children and parents with pseudonyms. Regarding children's claims and rights, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), representation, and the interplay with parents' claims and rights —including circuit conflicts —the questions presented are: / • Whether children have the right to be represented by their pro se non-attorney parent(s) in their claims, and reciprocally, whether those parent(s) have the right to represent their children's claims, along with their own and intertwined claims without counsel —as permitted by the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits for certain claims (e.g., SSI) — or whether such representation is barred, as held by the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. If they cannot secure counsel, whether courts should, per Rule 17(c), actively recruit or appoint attorneys —since children ’s claims requiring adjudication mandate trained legal assistance to fully protect their rights, as held by the Second Circuit —or whether claims and cases iii may be routinely dismissed in other circuits while ignoring Rule 17(c), without first recruiting counsel. Whether the proper procedure for parents appearing is as next friends or otherwise; and whether courts (federal or state) can appoint a Guardian ad Litem without assessing parental fitness, thereby intruding between parent and child and potentially undermining the fundamental rights both parties hold and protections parent(s) provide(s). Whether there is any right to an attorney where the court has constructed rules, precedents, or practices precluding pro se meaningful access to the courts unless represented, such as in class actions, representing one ’s child regarding fundamental and civil rights, or on appeal. Whether children can pursue §1983 claims seeking redress for the wrongful, unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents —either absent state action against the children themselves, or not—as they have a right to family integrity under, i