Does Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8(a) require only ordinary pleading standards for §1981 and §1983 claims post-Twombly/Iqbal, and must the Ninth Circuit employ standard Rule 56 procedures to assess evidence sufficiency?

In the Ninth Circuit ’s opinion, Petitioner must allege a prima facie case of discrimination and “the requisite meeting of the minds to establish a conspiracy ” (App. 5-6) for his 42. U.S.C. §1981 and §1983 claims, respectively. Despite Petitioners voluminous Rule 56(c) “materials in the record ” opposing summary judgment motion, that court concluded Petitioner failed to “adduce evidence ” asserting his §1981 and §1983 claims. Although Petitioner ’s constitutional challenges to the Final [Disciplinary] Order ’s validity were never raised, briefed, argued, or decided in state courts, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “Dang cannot now relitigate the issue of the Disciplinary Order ’s validity ” (App. 4). The questions presented are: 1. Does Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8(a) require only ordinary, not heightened and detailed, pleading standards for 42. U.S.C. §1981 and §1983 claims postTwom b ly/Iq ball 2. Must the Ninth Circuit employ the well-established . Rule 56 procedures and review the record as a whole to assess the sufficiency of Petitioner ’s evidence for his 42. U.S.C. §§1983, 1981, and 1985(3) claims instead of applying Rule 8(a) plausibility pleading standard? 3. Does the Ninth Circuit contravene Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) in precluding Petitioner ’s First-, Fourth-, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the state administrative Final Order ’s validity; constitutional challenges that were never raised, briefed, argued, or determined in state courts?