Whether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that state officials fabricated evidence against the petitioner accrues only upon favorable termination of criminal proceedings, and whether lower courts erred in dismissing such a claim as time-barred despite recent discovery of fabrication

1. Whether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that state officials fabricated evidence against the petitioner accrues only upon favorable termination of the criminal proceedings (consistent with McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct 2149 (2019)), and whether the lower courts erred in dismissing such a claim as time-barred despite the petitioner ’s recent discovery of the fabrication. 2. Whether, in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a civil-rights claim that would impugn an ongoing criminal prosecution should be dismissed outright or instead stayed pending the outcome of the criminal case an issue on which courts are divided, and which implicates the petitioner ’s ability to seek redress for egregious misconduct (fabrication of evidence) before it is too late. 3. Whether a private corporation and its employees who coordinated with police and prosecutors to detain the petitioner and fabricate incriminating evidence can be held liable under § 1983 as acting ii “under color of’ state law, or whether the Third Circuit ’s contrary conclusion conflicts with this Court ’s state-action jurisprudence (Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)). 4. Whether the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity bars a claim against a prosecutor who allegedly fabricated evidence and pursued a malicious prosecution against the petitioner, or whether such conduct falls outside the prosecutor ’s protected advocacy role (see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)), especially in light of the due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges based on fabricated evidence. 5. Whether absolute judicial immunity shields a judge who allegedly conspired with others to use fabricated evidence and exhibited bias against the petitioner, or whether such egregious, non-judicial conduct falls outside the scope of immunity (or at least warrants prospective relief), consistent with the fundamental right to a fair and impartial tribunal. iii 6. Whether the assessment of appellate costs against a good-faith pro se civil-rights litigant —who has endured seven years of malicious prosecution based on fabricated evidence, persistent judicial bias, and coercive pressure from the New Jersey courts; who has suffered grave violations of his human rights; and who is now mentally, physically, and financially exhausted —violates principles of equal access to justice and unjustly chills the exercise of appellate rights, thereby warranting this Court ’s supervisory intervention. 7. Whether the overall handling of petitioner ’s case including the fabricated evidence, procedural irregularities, and the dismissal of all his claims on technical grounds reveals a broader failure of the justice system to protect constitutional rights, such that this Court ’s intervention is needed to restore confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.