Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private actors constitute state actors when they exercise governmental authority or act jointly with state officials. Courts have disagreed about how to apply state action doctrine to private contractors who exercise state-licensed police powers at government-funded operations while suppressing constitutionally protected speech. In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit held that private security contractors possessing state-licensed police powers do not qualify as state actors under § 1983, even when they exercise those powers at government operations to suppress speech on matters of public concern. That ruling reflects a narrow approach to state action doctrine that conflicts with this Court's functional analysis in Brentwood Academy and creates a constitutional accountability gap. Two other circuits have similarly restricted state action doctrine for private contractors, while multiple circuits apply broader, functional approaches that recognize state action when private parties exercise governmental authority under state license or in coordination with government officials. The question presented is: Whether private security contractors exercising state-licensed police powers at government-funded operations constitute state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they suppress constitutionally protected speech on matters of public concern.

Whether private security contractors exercising state-licensed police powers at government-funded operations constitute state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they suppress constitutionally protected speech on matters of public concern