Whether a judicial conclusion that no set of facts can plausibly exist to plead under the ADA that an employer regards an employee as presently disabled misinterprets the plain language of the statutory amendments and Congressional intent to construe disability broadly, and whether narrowly redefining the statutory definition of disability constitutes impermissible judicial usurpation of Congress's legislative function

Fear and the desire for safety are powerful forces. They can lead to a clamor for action — almost any action—as long as someone does something to address a perceived threat. A leader or an expert who claims he can fix everything, if only we do exactly as he says, can prove an irresistible force. We do not need to confront a bayonet, we need only a nudge, before we willingly abandon the nicety of requiring laws to be adopted by our legislative representatives and accept rule by decree. …. We may even cheer on those who ask us to disregard our normal lawmaking processes and forfeit our personal freedoms. Arizona v. Mayorkas, 143 S. Ct. 1312, 1315, 598 U.S. ___ (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring ). The judiciary at times in this nation’ s h istory has itself succumbed to the powerful force of fear. Rather than remain in its proper Article III role, confronted with a global health threat, the Eleventh Circuit in this case marched without hesitation directly into Article I powers and impermissibly —and inexplicably—carved out an entirely new statutory bar to seeking judicial redress in express contravention of the clear language of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and welldocumented Congressional intent. The questions presented are: (1) Whether a judicial conclusion that no set of facts can plausibly exist to plead under the ADA that an employer regards an employee as presently disabled —by being diseased in the absence of ii immune system augmentation —misinterprets the plain language of the statutory amendments and express Congressional intent to construe disability as broadly as possible to prohibit discrimination. (2) Whether barring employee claims under the ADA by narrowly redefining the statutory definition of disability to effectively remove “ being regarded as having such an impairment ” pertaining to immune system augmentation consti-tutes impermissible judicial usurpation of Congress ’ legislative function in violation of constitutional Separation of Powers .