Whether the 'some harm' standard applies to sexual harassment claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII

1 To Respondent Robin Shahar: Whether the “some harm” standard articulated by this Court in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis , 601 U.S. 346 (2024) applies to sexual harassment claims (both tangible employment action and hostile work environment) under the Equal Protection Clause to the United State Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq . (“Title VII”) in analyzing whether an employee has been subjected to both a hostile work environment and tangible employment action sexual harassment. QUESTION 2 To Respondent City of Atlanta: Whether a municipality’s mere adoption of a sexual harassment policy shields it from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability under this Court’s precedents in Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) and City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) or whether the municipality must also enforce and not intentionally violate the policy to avoid liability. QUESTION 3 To Respondent City of Atlanta: Whether a charging party’s correction of a technical defect in a timely amendment to a charge of discrimination relates back to the date of filing of the original charge. ii QUESTION 4 To Respondent City of Atlanta: Whether an employer may subject an employee to a fit-for-duty exam not because it believes the exam is a business necessity but to avoid liability for discrimination under the ADA and to set an employee up for termination in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (“ADA”), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”). QUESTION 5 To Respondent City of Atlanta: Whether under Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976), because the proper resolution of the issue relating to the waiver of attorney-client privilege on certain emails withheld in this case is beyond doubt and injustice would result from the withholding of the emails, the circuit court should have addressed and resolved the issue.