Whether a state-court decision is 'contrary to' federal law where its reasoning and outcome contradict materially indistinguishable Supreme Court precedents despite correctly citing the governing legal standard

In connection with petitioner’s capital sentencing proceeding, trial counsel failed to investigate and present voluminous , powerful mitigation evidence, in a manner that was materially indistinguishable from the ineffective assistance of counsel at issue in Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) , and Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) . In this federal habeas proceeding, the court of appeals acknowledged that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s stated reasons for denying petitioner post -conviction relief contradicted Williams and Wiggins in important respects. Yet the court of appeals held that the state court’s decision was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law . 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) . The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state -court decision is “contrary to” federal law where its reasoning and outcome contradict this Court’s materially indistinguishable precedents, but the state court correctly cites the governing legal standard in passing . 2. Whether , when a state court’s stated reasoning reveals that it s decision is contrary to or unreasonably applies federal law, federal habeas courts can deny relief by hypothesiz ing alternative justifi cations for the state court’s decision. 3. Whether , under 28 U.S.C. 2243, federal habeas courts may deny relief where the petitioner has established that his conviction or sentence is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) .