Question not identified.

Respondent Maria T. Vullo is a former New York official who used her regulatory power to coerce third parties into taking action against Petitioner , the National Rifle Association of America , to punish and suppress its protected First Amendment speech. Last year, in NRA v. Vullo , 602 U.S. 175 (2024), this Court unanimously held that these allegations stated a claim against Vullo for violating the NRA’s First Amendment rights. In doing so, the Court emphasized that it “d[id] not break new ground” but instead only “reaffirm[ed]” its decades -old precedent in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U.S. 58 (1963), which “stands for the principle that a government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly: A government official cannot c oerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” Vullo , 602 U.S. at 190. As the Court explained, Bantam Books squarely held that “a government entity’s ‘threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion’ against a third party ‘to achieve the suppression’ of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment.” Id. at 180. On remand, however, the Second Circuit ruled for Vullo on qualified immunity, because “a reasonable officer in Vullo’s position likely would have thought that her conduct . . . was permissible.” Pet.App. 32a. The question s presented are: 1. When Vullo implemented her scheme against the NRA, was it clearly established that the First Amendment did not allow a government official to coerce a disfavored speaker’s service providers to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf? ii 2. When it is obvious that a government official’s conduct violates the Constitution under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, is the violation clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity despite some factual distinctions that are irrelevant under the governing constitutional rule?