Whether good cause for lawsuit reinstatement under FRCP Rule 4(m) turns on incarceration status and lack of defendant prejudice

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia—reciting its awareness that the Petitioners /Plaintiffs were incarcerated and even some in solitary confinement evidently in retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit and unable to respond—cut off the appeal below on summary affirmance. Knowing that the Plaintiffs were unable to meet deadlines dismissed the appeal before the Plaintiffs had a chance to file an Appellant brief, just as the U.S. District Court had also done in prematurely dismissing the case at the trial level. The Questions Presented are: 1. Does “good cause” as a basis for reinstatement of a lawsuit and/or extension of time under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 4(m) for failure to serve a Defendant turn on the test “through no fault of the litigant,” such as being incarcerated and/or in solitary confinement? Is it sufficient to show that the deviation was “through no fault of the Plaintiff’ or does “good cause” require something more (as suggested by 2. Does “good cause” as a basis for reinstatement of a lawsuit or extension of time under FRCP Rule 4(m) to serve a Defendant include considering the absence of any inconvenience or prejudice to the Defendants? 3. Where all parties and the lower courts agree that the Complaint and amended complaints actually included a telephone number, could the District Court dismiss the case under Local Rule 5.1(c)(1) for failure to include a telephone number—that was in fact included —on speculation that someone might not answer the phone number—although the attorney in fact under a power of attorney did answer when the Defendants il called the phone number (and Defendants immediately hung up when he answered the phone number)? That is must the phone number on a complaint be “his” phone number owned as the exclusive property of a Plaintiff rather than “his” phone number where a Plaintiff can be reached? 4. Where Local Rule 5.1(c)(1) requires a “residential address” but all parties and the lower courts agree that most of the Plaintiffs resided for years in Federal prison as inmates—especially those like Edward Jacob Lang who was arrested early in 2021 and continuously incarcerated until January 21, 2025—can the District Court dismiss the case for disclosing that the Plaintiffs reside in Federal prison? That is, if a Plaintiff has no residential address (because they are in prison) can his or her case be dismissed under Local Rule 5.1(c)(1)? 5. Where the initial complaint was filed on January 5, 2024, the District Court dismissed the initial complaint as to all Plaintiffs on April 30, 2024, (day 118), but on May 20, 2024, ECF Dkt. #15, the Defendant U.S. Capitol Police recited and conceded having been previously served with the Complaint in its Memorandum in opposition to re ECF Dkt. # 11 Motion for Relief from Judgment, did the District Court err in denying an extension of time to serve the Defendants? 6. Can the District Court under Local Rule 5.1(c)(1) dismiss the case for providing a post office box address with the U.S. Postal Service [established under the U.S. Constitution as the official mail service of the U.S. Government] while also noting that the Plaintiff is in the custody of a Federal prison and has no residence. 7. Did the Court of Appeals err by ignoring the clear errors of the trial court and trying to force the error through a narrow slot of relief from a judgment rather than that the trial court was simply wrong? 8. Did the District Court abuse its discretion where it dismissed the case without prejudice, an attorney was then found to represent the Plaintiffs, the attorney got all of the Defendants properly served, the attorney’s law practice telephone number satisfied Local Rule 5.1(©)(1), and the attorney’s law practice official address satisfied Local Rule 5.1(c)(1), but the District Court did not allow reinstatement of the Plaintiffs’ claims? 9. Where FRCP Rule 4(m) requires service of the lawsuit on Defendants within 90 days, but the