Does law enforcement's collection of digital location-history data pursuant to geofence warrants violate the Fourth Amendment?

Fourth Amendment rights vary among circuits and state high courts, as w ell as between Texas federal and Texas state courts, regarding “geofence” warrants. These warrants demand the digital location-history data of companies’ customers—here, Google users—without identifying a suspect. Compare United States v. Smith , 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), with, e.g. , Pet. App. 1a-54a. Instead, law enforcement defines a temporal and geographical parameter regarding a crime scene and collects data for all users’ devices present within the geofence. Initial data re turns are anonymized, but the typical three-step geofence warrant—like the one in petitioner’s case—gives advance authorization for increasingly invasive request s at the officer’s sole and judicially unsupervised discretion, culminating in disclosure of a user’s identi fying information and, as here, even six months of IP history for devices that the officer selects from the initial returns. The Questions Presented are: 1. Does law enforcement’s collection of digital location-history data purs uant to geofence warrants like the one in petitioner’s case violate the Fourth Amendment? 2. Should the exclusionary rule apply to evidence derived from the geofence warrant?