Fourth Amendment rights vary among circuits
and state high courts, as well as intrajurisdictionally
between Texas federal and Texas state courts,
regarding "geofence" warrants. These warrants
demand the digital location-history data of companies' customers—here, Google users—without identifying a
suspect. Compare United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th
817 (5th Cir. 2024), with, e.g., Pet. App. 1a-54a.
Instead, law enforcement defines a temporal and
geographical parameter regarding a crime scene and
collects data for all users' devices present within the geofence. Initial data returns are anonymized, but
the typical three-step geofence warrant—like the one
in petitioner's case—gives advance authorization for increasingly invasive requests at the officer's sole and
judicially unsupervised discretion, culminating in
disclosure of a user's identifying information and, as
here, even six months of IP history for devices that
the officer selects from the initial returns.

1. Does law enforcement's collection of digital
location-history data pursuant to geofence warrants
like the one in petitioner's case violate the Fourth
Amendment?

2. Should the exclusionary rule apply to evidence
derived from the geofence warrant?

Does law enforcement's collection of digital location-history data pursuant to geofence warrants violate the Fourth Amendment?