Whether federal courts can dismiss pro se, IFP civil rights and RICO complaints with prejudice at the pre-service stage without notice or opportunity to amend when alleging ongoing constitutional violations

1. Whether the Fifth Amendment ’s due process guarantee and congressional intent behind 28 U.S.C. § 1915 prohibit federal courts from dismissing pro se, IFP civil rights and RICO complaints with prejudice at the pre-service stage under § 1915(e)(2)(B) —without notice, opportunity to amend, or adversarial process —when the complaint alleges ongoing constitutional violations, judicial retaliation, and fraud on federal programs; and whether such dismissals, which disproportionately harm indigent litigants, violate equal protection, undermine Congress ’s authority to ensure court access, and deepen a circuit split with the Ninth, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which require opportunity to amend absent clear futility. 2. Whether a federal judge with undisclosed academic, professional, and familial ties to named state defendants may sua sponte invoke judicial, quasi-judicial, sovereign, and prosecutorial immunity —before service, without jurisdictional findings, and without recusal —to dismiss a pro se civil rights and RICO action alleging conduct outside lawful authority, thereby violating due process, congressional intent behind 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and the separation of powers by preempting Congress ’s authority to provide federal remedies for state misconduct; and whether such actions contravene this Court ’s precedents in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., and Rippo v. Baker, which mandate recusal for bias and prohibit judicial preemption of individualized defenses. 3. Whether state judges and court-appointed attorneys, acting under color of law but without jurisdiction for over five years, may be held liable undei ’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 18 U.S.C. § 1962 for operating a racketeering enterprise that defrauds Title IV-D and IV-E programs, retaliates against whistleblowers, and exploits private matrimonial disputes for financial gain, in violation of congressional intent and the separation of powers; and whether lower courts may foreclose such claims based on intra-circuit precedent like Kim V. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2018), despite conflicting rulings from the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which permit liability for extrajudicial and racketeering conduct, thus undermining uniform enforcement of federal civil rights and anti-racketeering laws. ii JURISDICTION Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The final judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was entered on February 13, 2025, and a timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on March 28, 2025. This petition is filed within 90 days of the denial of rehearing, in accordance with Rule 13.1 of the Rules of this Court.This case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3); and 18 U.S.C. § 1962.