Where government action prevented Petitioner from bringing his claims under Brady and Giglio in his initial § 2254 motion, should a second-in-time motion asserting those claims be deemed non-successive under this Court's analysis in Panetti?

Under Panetti v. Quarterman , 551 U.S. 930, 94344 (2007), the phrase “second or-successive” as used in 28 U.S.C. 2244, does not apply to every habeas petition (in that case, a competency -to-be executed claim) filed after an initial petition. In Tompkins v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. , 557 F.3d 1257, 1260 (2009), the Eleventh Circuit limited Panetti ’s scope only to competency -to-be-executed claims ; reasoned that any violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), necessarily ripened at trial regardless of when it was uncovered; and held that a second -in-time Brady claim must therefore be raised in a second -or-successive § 2244 petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Bell’s Petition for Initial Hearing En Banc to reconsider its decision in Tompkins. Petitioner ’s initial habeas petition was dismissed without a merits ruling . He discovered, through due diligence and after his death warrant was signed, the factual predicate of a Brady /Giglio violation. The following question is presented: Where government action prevented Petitioner from bringing his claims under Brady and Giglio in his initial § 2254 motion, should a second -intime motion asserting those claims be deemed non -successive under this Court’s analysis in Panetti ?