In the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case, was it unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the defense attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest?

This is a death penalty case from Alabama in which the following occurred: (1) the defense attorney was being paid in substantial part by the defendant’s father; (2) the attorney learned before trial that the defendant had been abused as a child by his father —the same person paying the attorney; (3) the defendant’s father told the attorney that he would be “done with helping with this case” if the attorney presented evidence of the abuse as mitigation at trial; (4) the attorney never informed the defendant or the court of any conflict of interest and instead privately obtained a signed document from the defendant agreeing to forego any use of the abuse evidence; (5) the attorney then called the father to testify at trial that the defendant was raised in a supportive home; and (6) the trial court expressly relied on the father’s testimony that the defendant had a positive upbringing when imposing the death penalty. The state appellate court held that the attorney did not have a n actual conflict of interest, and therefore the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to effective , conflict -free counsel . On habeas review, the Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The question presented is this: In the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case, was it unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the defense attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest ?