Shahriar Behnamian v. Coke Morgan Stewart, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Acting Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al.
ERISA SocialSecurity Patent Trademark EmploymentDiscrimina JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a pro se plaintiff has properly served a defendant when the plaintiff serves the defendant himself at the advice of the court's clerk and then the court's clerk notifying the plaintiff that he has properly served the defendant at the time of submitting the executed summons to the court in person, and the District Court failing to meet its obligation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(4)(A) to notify and grant the pro se plaintiff a reasonable extension of time to cure deficiencies in his service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)?
is: Whether the defenses available under 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(h)(4)(iii) apply to primary patent examiners and hence, would a person ’s employment as a primary patent examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office constitute a profession? 3. Whether an unintentional mistake on a timesheet always constitutes conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, ii misrepresentation, deceit, or a violation of Federal or State laws or regulations? 4. Whether being explicitly advised by an employer that an employee has no right to file a discrimination claim effectively delays the 45 day reporting obligation until the employee becomes aware of his right to file a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ” with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). It is understood from the Federal Circuit ’s ruling that retaliatory job suspensions and compensatory withholdings are lawful under Title VII when a retaliation is based on discriminatory action against a father of a child to be born in the immediate future. Furthermore, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e(k), provides that “[t]he terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ” and "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes * * * as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Id. The question presented is: The question presented is: Does Title VII prohibit retaliation based on discrimination as to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, ” on the basis of all “sex”, iii or is its reach limited to retaliation based on discriminatory employer conduct against women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions limited in their ability or inability to work, and whether, and in what circumstances, an employer that provides work accommodations to pregnant employees with work limitations, must provide work accommodations to an employee who is the father of a pregnant woman ’s child and additionally assuming the duties of the pregnant woman who is limited in her ability or inability to perform her normal duties at full capacity?