Byron Lewis Black v. Tennessee
HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
Does a competency to be executed claim based upon common law 'idiocy' that presents a petitioner's current mental functioning and supported by recent and debilitating brain defects constitute a second or successive habeas petition?
In Panetti v. Quarterman , this Court held that a competency to be executed claim d oes not constitute a second or successive habeas petition. 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007). “We conclude, in accord with this precedent, that Congress did not intend the provisions of AEDPA addressing ‘ second or successive’ petitions to govern a filing in the unusual posture presented here: a § 2254 application raising a Ford -based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is ripe. ” Id. Mr. Black raised a competency to be execut ed claim in state court arguing that he was incompetent to be executed based upon the common law prohibition on the execution of “idiots.” See Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986). After the state courts denied relief, Mr. Black filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising an identical competency claim. Distinguishing Mr. Black’s claim from that of the “true Ford ” claim, t he district court held that Mr. Black’s claim constituted a second or successive habeas petition and transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit. Disregarding the Court’s unmistakable holding in Panetti , the Sixth Circuit held that Mr. Black’s claim was a second or successive claim and denied Mr. Black permission to file a successor petition. The question presented in this case is: Does a competency to be executed claim based upon common law “idiocy” that presents a petitioner’s current mental functioning and supported by recent and debilitating brain defects constitute a second or successive habeas petition ?