Whether the lower courts' refusal to recognize implied consent for a fully litigated excessive force claim conflicts with controlling precedents of this Court and Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1. Implied Consent Under Rule 15(b). Whether the lower courts ’ refusal to recognize implied consent for a fully litigated excessive force claim — despite Defendants ’ extensive discovery, deposition questioning, and summary judgment arguments —conflicts with controlling precedents of this Court and Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which hold that issues actually tried by consent are treated as if pleaded. 2. Summary Judgment and Video Evidence Contradictions. Whether the district court ’s grant of summary judgment in the face of video evidence “blatantly contradicting ” Defendants ’ sworn accounts conflicts with Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), and the Eighth Circuit ’s requirement that courts adopt the non-moving party ’s version of events when video evidence creates a genuine dispute of fact. 3. Excessive Force Against a Restrained Individual (Objective Reasonableness). Whether classifying the continued use of force on a compliant, handcuffed detainee as “objectively reasonable ” contravenes Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Eighth Circuit authority (Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011)), thereby requiring uniform guidance from this Court to uphold the Fourth Amendment ’s prohibition against excessive force. 4. District Court ’s Selective Adoption of Magistrate ’s Findings. Whether the district court ’s selective acceptance of only those portions of the magistrate judge ’s report favoring Defendants —while rejecting the magistrate ’s implied-consent finding without explanation —departs from Eighth Circuit standards (Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)) that holds ” Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous', and implicates due process by undermining reasoned judicial review. 5. Failure to Disclose Judicial Conflict of Interest. Whether a judge ’s undisclosed prior attorney-client relationship with the defense ’s counsel, followed by rulings favoring that counsel ’s clients, transgresses this Court ’s directives in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), as well as the Eighth Circuit ’s standards for recusal when impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 6. Impact on Due Process and the Integrity of the Judiciary. Whether these combined departures from binding Supreme Court and Eighth ii Circuit precedent —refusal to acknowledge implied consent, ignoring contradictory video evidence at summary judgment, and failure to disclose a clear conflict of interest —raise an important federal question warranting certiorari to safeguard the due process rights of litigants and preserve public confidence in the judicial process. III.