Whether federal appellate courts may dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claims through procedural limitations when the underlying due process violation is established by opposing counsel's sworn judicial admission of notice failure

I. Whether federal appellate courts may dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claims through procedural limitations when the underlying due process violation is established by opposing counsel's sworn judicial admission of notice failure under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242 (4th Cir. 2024) (reversing dismissal of pro se § 1983 claims and requiring accommodation for constitutional violations); Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023) (procedural schemes cannot categorically prevent constitutional review); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards). II. Whether state court orders entered without subject matter jurisdiction that restrict constitutional rights of access to courts violate the Due Process Clause when subsequently relied upon by federal courts to dismiss civil rights claims. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (due process requires proper procedural safeguards before termination of protected interests); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 provides federal remedy when state processes inadequate). III. Whether the constitutional right of access to courts prohibits federal courts from creating categorical barriers to review of multiple undisputed constitutional violations, including jurisdictional defects and notice failures admitted by opposing counsel. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right of access to courts cannot be denied through procedural barriers); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (meaningful access to courts is constitutional touchstone); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (systematic barriers to court access violate constitutional rights). 2 | P a g e IV. Whether federal courts may dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) conspiracy claims through procedural limitations when the record establishes coordinated conduct between private attorneys and state judicial officers to obstruct justice and deny constitutional rights through jurisdictionally defective proceedings. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (access to courts violations require actual injury from systematic official action); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2014) (§ 1985 conspiracy requires coordinated conduct to obstruct justice). V. Whether gatekeeper orders requiring attorney representation for court filings violate the First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances when entered by courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (First Amendment protects right to petition courts); BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) (prior restraints on petitioning rights subject to strict scrutiny). VI. Whether wealth-based restrictions on court access through mandatory attorney representation violate the Equal Protection Clause when imposed without compelling state interest or proper procedural safeguards. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (wealth cannot bar access to fundamental constitutional protections); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (restrictions on fundamental rights require compelling justification and narrow tailoring).