Did the Sixth Circuit depart from this Court's decision in Farmer v. Brennan by improperly denying qualified immunity to Petitioners based on insufficient evidence of actual knowledge of substantial medical risk?

The Constitution protects incarcerated persons from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs, but this Court has made clear that liability arises only when a defendant actually knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). As this Court recognized in Farmer, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted,” and courts must consider the “difficult problems of prison administration” and the need for deference to officials making medical and custodial judgments in that environment. Consistent with those principles, most circuits require proof that jail medical staff had subjective awareness of an imminent risk—and that their response was objectively unreasonable—before denying qualified immunity. In this case, an inmate was booked into the Lake County, Ohio jail and reported taking several medications, though he identified only one by name (Metformin, a medication used to treat diabetes). Petitioner Nurse Watson reviewed the intake form, ordered Metformin, arranged a diabetic diet, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for the following week to address the inmate’s other concerns. Petitioner Nurse Snow never interacted with or even knew of the inmate, yet the courts below inferred—without evidentiary support and contrary to her sworn testimony—that she must have reviewed his screening form. Days later, the inmate died from issues allegedly related to hypertension. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nevertheless held that both nurses could be personally liable under § 1983 for not acting on information that merely suggested the inmate would need additional medication at some point in the future, and further concluded that their actions—ordering medication, ii providing dietary accommodations, and scheduling follow-up care—were themselves constitutionally unreasonable. In so holding, the court departed from Farmer’s subjective and reasonableness standards and applied clearly established law at too high a level of generality, contrary to this Court’s decisions in Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018), and Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015). 1. Did the Sixth Circuit depart from this Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) in denying qualified immunity to Petitioners, despite the lack of evidence that Petitioners had actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm, because they failed to act on information suggesting the need for medication at some point in the future? 2. Did the Sixth Circuit depart from this Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) in denying qualified immunity to Petitioners, by finding that a medical response that creates a brief deprivation of a commonplace medication unnecessary to staving off any apparently imminent patient risk is unreasonable and runs afoul of the Constitution? 3. Did the Sixth Circuit depart from this Court’s decisions in Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2018) and Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) and numerous other cases by considering clearly established law at too high a level of generality rather than giving particularized consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case? iii RELATED CASES This case arises from and is related to the following proceedings: • Wiertella v. Lake County, et al., No. 1:20-cv-02739-BMB, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Judgment entered Mar. 26, 2024. • Wiertella v. Lake County, et al., No. 24-3311, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judgment entered Jun. 24, 2025; rehearing en banc denied Jul. 31, 2025.