Whether the actions of Tax Court Judge Morrison and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals constituted judicial bias and deprivation of due process in a tax levy case

No question identified. : QUESTIONS 1. Do the intentional, deliberate, and purposeful actions and statements of Tax Court Judge Morrison, whether derived from 'judicial' or 'extrajudicial' sources, which began shortly after his assignment to the case and continued throughout the entire 8 years of the proceedings, evidence an extreme level of pervasive bias and favoritism such that he was unwilling and unable to render a fair judgment. 2. Given the intentional, deliberate, and purposeful actions of Judge Morrison, did the court err in failing to grant Plotkin's motions for Judge Morrison's recusal or reassignment. 3. Did Judge Morrison, deliberately and intentionally disregarding the requirements of Tax Court Rule 121, err in granting the IRS summary judgment based upon his knowingly false 'interpretation' of Plotkin's allegation of incorrect §6330(c)( 1) verification, an 'interpretation' that at best, and in the light most favorable to Judge Morrison, might be considered as an 'inference' favoring the IRS, 4. Do the intentional, deliberate, and purposeful actions and statements of the Court of Appeals, including misstatement and fabrication, whether derived from 'judicial' or 'extrajudicial' sources, evidence an extreme level of pervasive bias and favoritism such that the Court of Appeals was unwilling to render a fair judgment. 5. Did the deliberate, intentional and purposeful actions of both Tax Court Judge Morrison and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals deprive Plotkin of his right to due process as provided for in Amendment 5 to the Constitution of the United States through their ii 3 inability and unwillingness to decide Plotkin's case fairly and impartially and in an unbiased manner. 6. Did the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals abuse its discretion by verifying and determining the IRS had, as mandated by IRC §6330(c)( 1), met the requirements of any applicable law prior to sending Plotkin a notice of intent to levy, despite having received actual notice from the IRS that it had not met the requirements of several laws before sending that notice. 7. Did the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals, despite the information in the administrative file it had obtained during the course of the CDP hearing, abuse its discretion by determining the 'balancing test' provided for by IRC §6330(c)(3) favored sustaining the levy action proposed by the IRS. 8. Did the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals abuse its discretion by determining the 'balancing test' provided for by IRC §6330(c)(3) favored sustaining the levy action proposed by the IRS because the hearing officer could not, as she wanted, close Plotkin's case as 'currently not collectible' (CNC), even though Plotkin had not requested that the hearing officer consider the collection alternative of CNC status. 9. Given the requirement in 26 U.S.C. 7443 that judges of the Tax Court are to be nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, does 26 U.S.C. 7447 validly authorize the chief judge of the Tax Court to appoint, as Senior Judges with full judicial powers, those former judges of the Tax Court who's terms have expired and whom the President of the united States has specifically refused to iii nominate for an additional term even though those former judges have advised the President of their desire to serve an additional term.. iv