Does Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause to criminally punish the simple possession of an object that moved from one state to another at some time in the past?

Apparently exercising its authority under the Commerce Clause, Congress criminally prohibited the simple possession of a firearm that was “in or affecting” commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Despite widespread recognition that this statute reaches beyond thi s Court’s Commerce Clause cases, lower courts have understood this Court’s statutory interpretation in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), as a constitutional pronouncement that a “minimal nexus requirement” (specifically, the fact that a fi rearm at some point in the past moved from one state to another) is all that is needed to establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. However, numerous lower courts have recognized that this conclusion conflicts with later cases from this Cou rt that interpret the Commerce Clause. This appeal presents two issues: 1. Does Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause to criminally punish the simple possession of an object that moved from one state to another at some time in the past? 2. Is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applied unconstitutionally when the court tells the jury it must find only prior interstate movement but does not require it to find that the gun possession was currently “in or affecting” commerce? ii ii