Whether a Petitioner claiming insufficiency of evidence under Jackson v. Virginia can raise a legitimate constitutional claim through a Criminal Rule-29 Motion for Acquittal when establishing reasonable doubt and the state fails to disprove a negative defense

No question identified. : CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 1 (related to COA Claim One) (l)(a) Whether a Petitioner who claims that "the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's Criminal Rule-29 Motion for Acquittal for Insufficiency of the Evidence as a matter of law" has raised a legitimate constitutional claim under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 at 317 n.10 and 318 n.ll, which provides a mechanism for relief under the Fifth Amendment, adopting "the Curley test" prescribed in Curley, 160 F.2d 229 at 232-233 (1947, CA D.C.), which entitles Petitioner to a judgment of acquittal as a matter of law (within the meaning of Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S, at 234, 237) when two conditions are satisfied: (1) when the defendant testifies and establishes reasonable doubt by a preponderance of the evidence, and (2) when the State fails to disprove an element of a "negative-defense" thus failing to create a genuine dispute of fact for the jury to decide? (l)(b) Whether Petitioner suffered prejudice without ever having an opportunity to have the true merits of her "Jackson-Curley " constitutional claim decided due to the Sixth Circuit's refusal to recognize a fairly presented due process question because of its long-standing inconsistent view on "sudden passion" as a traditional defense to murder, which is raised by the defendant by a preponderance and disproved by the prosecution as part of its intermediate burden? ii (l)(c) Whether the Sixth Circuit after having recognized in 2000 in Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 at 304 (relying on Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S, at 122) that voluntary manslaughter is a "negative defense " to aggravated murder and after having decided that once the defendant has established the elements of the "negative-defense " by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution, for the purpose of due process, must disprove the defense as part of its intermediate burden, whether the Sixth Circuit can backtrack from its legal conclusion in Gall v. Parker by relying on its prior and distinguishable 1996-panel precedent (Rhodes, 91 F,3d 803) , to deny habeas relief and conclude that the prosecution does not need to disprove the defendant acted in heat of passion to secure a conviction of the higher charge? (l)(d) Whether the USSC has already decided that a "negative-defense" is distinct from an for the purpose of due process in Engle v, Isaac, 456 U.S, at 122 ("due process commands the prosecution to prove absence of... [element of the defense] if that defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of the charged crime”), and Martin v. Ohio (1987), 480 U.S, 228 at 237 ("The clear implication of this ruling is that when an affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime . In such a case, In re Winship, 397 U.S, 358 (1970), requires the state to prove the nonexistence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt"), and whether the Seventh Circuit in Brown v. Eplett, 48 F.4th 543 offers a thorough analysis of the prosecution's burden to disprove the elements of a "negative-defense" in conformity with the due process principles clearly established by the United States Supreme Court? CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 2 (related to COA Claim Two) (2)(a) Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying a COA to review a decision from the habeas court denying relief as a federal court is restrained from dismissing a constitutional claim merely because it was labeled a or whether such a claim as a threshold inquiry, must first be construed as a sufficiency of the evidence, as held in Tibbs v. Fla., 457 31 at 45 (citing: Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S, 307) , as recognized by the Sixth Circuit in Nash v. Eberlin, 258 Fed, Appx, 761 ? (2)(b) Whether after applying the familiar standard of deciding every dispute of fact in favor of the prosecutor, whether the habeas court is under the duty to also consider materially relevant facts in favor of the defendant which have not been rebutted by the prosecution, which the State appellate court overlooked in its a