Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state supreme court to impose an interim suspension of an attorney's license without prior notice or hearing

I. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state supreme court to impose a imposes an interim suspension of an attorney ’s license deprivation of a liberty and property interest-without prior without pre-suspension notice, without a hearing, and without any findings of fact, citation or rule violations, or without findings of “serious ” misconduct as required by its own governing rules. This question implicates fundamental due process protections and presents a direct conflict among circuits regarding whether notice and hearing are constitutionally required before depriving a professional of their livelihood. The absence of notice, a hearing and any findings supporting the suspension would directly implicate the attorney ’s right to procedural due process, a fundamental fairness principle the Supreme Court has consistently protected. II. Whether a remand to cure procedural deficiencies in attorney disciplinary proceedings can validate a constitutionally void order, or whether such a remand fails to remedy initial due process violations, creating a conflict among the circuits and state courts of last resort. This issue presents an important question of federal law concerning whether subsequent proceedings can cure initial constitutional violations, an issue this Court has not yet resolved. III. When a state supreme court remands an attorney discipline case for findings of fact but refuses to lift a facially void interim suspension, and the disciplinary committee then initiates disbarment proceedings based on the void order, does this process constitute a sufficient deprivation of liberty and property interests to warrant a full review of the state ’s procedures? This question focuses on the escalating harm caused by the state ’s flawed process. It highlights how the void interim suspension is being leveraged to pursue a more serious punishment (disbarment). The ongoing deprivation of the attorney ’s ability to practice, without a valid basis, strengthens the argument for a federal remedy. It also shows the Supreme Court that this is not a one-off error but a pattern of due process violations. 2 IV. Is a federal court required to grant reciprocal suspension of an attorney ’s license when the state-court -imposed suspension was the result of a clear denial of procedural due process, and when the federal court has already found the underlying state process to be constitutionally infirm? The question highlights a potential conflict or significant federal question related to the principle of reciprocal discipline. While federal courts often recognize state disciplinary actions, they have no obligation to do so when the state ’s proceeding was fundamentally unfair. The question leverages the federal court ’s own denial of reciprocal suspension based on the lack of due process to show that the state ’s process is so flawed merits federal review, This is particularly compelling given the attorney ’s practice in federal court. V. Whether a judgment entered by a state court of last resort is void ab initio when personal and subject-matter jurisdiction were never properly acquired, including when the disbarment petition was filed under the wrong parties ’ legal names, was not verified, and was served through materially defective process in violation of state and federal law. This issue raises the question of whether state courts may disregard longsettled principles that defective service and lack of jurisdiction render a judgment void. VI. Whether jurisdictional defects —including lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction —can be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal, and whether a state court ’s refusal to consider such defects conflicts with established United States Supreme Court precedent. This question addresses a split among state and federal courts regarding the non-waivability of jurisdictional defects and the authority of appellate courts to vacate void judgments. 3