Whether a state postconviction scheme that bars relief for a guilty plea induced by a sentence later declared void ab initio violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Whether a state postconviction scheme that bars relief for a guilty plea induced by a sentence later declared void ab initio—on the grounds of procedural default or mootness —violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to postconviction relief—including vacatur of the guilty plea—where the plea was induced by an illegal sentencing scheme later declared void, and the sentence has already been fully served, consistent with the requirements that guilty pleas be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Whether the Constitution permits states to enforce procedural bars and mootness doctrines to deny relief from convictions based on guilty pleas that included sentencing terms void under state law, creating a nationwide conflict regarding the scope of constitutional protections for plea-based convictions.