Whether the Eleventh Circuit violated Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) and due process by issuing a mandate during pending en banc rehearing and reinstating a vacated panel opinion

Petitioner Andrew Bell, an independent candidate for the Georgia House in the November 2020 election, submitted 2,200 verified signatures to qualify for the ballot but was wrongfully excluded after state officials altered his verification records and applied a late-notice petition deadline. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of Georgia, challenging Georgia ’s ballot-access scheme, and the district court dismissed his First and Fourteenth Amendment clahns. On March 27, 2024, a three-judge Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed that dismissal. Bell timely petitioned for rehearing en banc, and on May 28, 2024, the court granted rehearing —vacating the panel opinion under Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-10. Despite rehearing being pending, the court issued its mandate on May 31, 2024, in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b). Bell then moved on May 20, 2025, to set aside the mandate and reinstate en banc review; the Eleventh Circuit denied that motion on August 7, 2025, effectively reviving a judgment the court had already vacated. The following questions are presented: 1. Did the Eleventh Circuit violate Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) by issuing a mandate while rehearing en banc was pending, and whether reinstating a vacated panel opinion without briefing decision violates due process Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, especially when those procedures impact access to appellate correction of substantial federal and constitutional errors? 2. Should a fraud-on-the-court exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, recognized in other circuits, apply when state election officials alter material verification documents in an election-access dispute? 3. Does the Eleventh Circuit ’s practice relating to reinstatement of previously vacated opinions, or denial of meaningful rehearing, contravenes longstanding Supreme Court precedent on vacatur of moot judgments, notably the Munsingwear doctrine, and raises questions of constitutional mootness and procedural fairness? 4. Do Georgia ’s ballot access provisions (O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-170, 2-2-171), as applied to independent candidates, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing impracticable deadlines, limiting write-in access, unverifiable procedures, foreclosing relief through deliberate delay, and denying meaningful appellate relief? 5. Do these appellate practices, when deployed in the context of constitutional ballot access litigation, create or perpetuate unconstitutional barriers to meaningful legal and political participation in violation of substantive and procedural due process, as articulated in Supreme Court ballot access decisions? 6. Should the Court reconsider the precedents in Jenness v. Fortson, Anderson v. Celebrezze, Burdick v. Takushi, and similar cases in light of recent procedural anomalies —such as issuing a mandate during pending rehearing and reinstating a vacated opinion —that undermine the judgments those cases relied upon? 7. Does the mootness doctrine ’s “capable of repetition yet evading review ” exception apply where independent candidates will confront the same ballot access barriers and truncated appellate timelines in future cycles?