Shahram Shakouri v. Scott Becker, former Judge, 219th Judicial District Court of Texas, Collin County, et al.
SocialSecurity DueProcess HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri Jurisdiction
Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in denying a poverty-stricken Petitioner's motion for extension of time to pay the filing fee, thereby denying meaningful judicial proceeding participation
is: (1) Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in denying the motion of this poverty-stricken Petitioner for extension of time to pay the filing fee, denied him the opportunity to partici pate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding where his feder al rights and his liberty was at stake? Question Number Two: Considering the unanimous opinion among some circuits that the phrase "inextricably intertwined" is frequently criticized. For in stance, Andrade, 9 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021)("placing the phrase at the root of many mistaken ."); and i Gilbank, 111 F.4th 759, n.5 (7th Cir. 2024)("that we should avoid the inextricably intertwined framing."). And in view of district court’s acknowledgment that: "Plaintiff is not chailending the validity of his conviction, his sentence or its durationthat "he is not asking the Court to review the judg ment of the state courts. Rather, he asserts he is targeting as un constitutional the procedures empolyed by the defendants to deny appeals of his conviction." *The questions presented are: (1) Whether the district court erred in concluding that Peti tioners's claim was inextricably intertwined with the state court's decision; and (2) Whether Petitioner's suit would not have been dismissed under inextricably intertwined framing, and would have ultimately succeeded if headed in another forum within the jurisdictions of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, and 11th circuits? Question Number Three: To the extent that the district court failed to acknowledge much less analyze and apply the relevant precedents of this Court in Exxon, Wilkinson, Skinner, and Reed to Petitioner's case, and in view of the Fifth Circuit holding in In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 545 F.3d at 310; that: "A court must exercise its discretion within the bounds set by relevant statutes and relevant binding precedents.", * The questions presented are: (1) Whether the district court's failure to account for Peti tioner's reliance on this Court's precedents was an abuse of discretion; and (2) Whether the district court's failure to explain why Petition er's claims did not pass the Wilkinson ’s or Skinner's test unjustly prejudice his substantial rights to the point of ii denying him a fair review of his complaint? Question Number Four: Judge Elsa Alcala in Ex Parte Dawson, 509 S.W. 3d 294, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) observed: "Texas Constitution's mandate that a quo rum of judges decide this Court's cases is not satisfied by what is effectively a standing order of this Court that permits an individual judge to act as a proxy for the quorum of judges on this Court on the basis of pre-vote on a category of cases that are never actually in dividually seen by any judge other than proxy judge." In light of said opinion, Petitioner targeted as unconstitutional the authoritative construction of Tex. Const. Art. V, § 4(b) and Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 11.07 governing Texas habeas process, and chall enged the legality of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' (TCCA's) standing order. To the extent that Petitioner did not make a direct challenge in the federal court to the state-court denial but rather, he made a facial challenge to the statutes and interpretations on which the decision was based. Truong, 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013), -'The questions presented are: (1) Whether the district court clearly erred in concluding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Petitioner's suit; and (2) Whether the district court erred in dismissing the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case? Question Number Five: To the extent that none of the essential elements of mandamus relief were presented in Petitioner's suit, and knowing that he did not ask the district court to take any action in the nature of mandat iii mus, nor did he invoke the United States Code 28 U.S.C. § 1615, or § 1361, -'The questions presented are: (1) Whether this Court’s holding in Feldman, Exxon, Wilkinson, Skinner, or Reed leaves any room for the view that since Petitione