Whether the Court should grant certiorari, vacate the Fourth Circuit's decision, and remand for further consideration in light of United States v. Taylor regarding the classification of a murder-for-hire offense as a 'crime of violence'

To hold that petitioner’s 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) conviction for conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death was a valid predicate “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c ), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that it may be possible to commit this crime without the requisite use of force, but reasoned that there was no “realistic probability” the government would prosecute such a case under § 1958(a) . A year later , this Court expressly rejected this “realistic probability” test in United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022 ). Post-Taylor , it is clear that (as the plain language of § 924(c) dictates ) courts evaluating whether a federal felony qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” must look only at the offense’s elements, not how it is usually committed or usually prosecuted . Given that this Court has expressly rejected the test the Fourth Circuit relied on to find that Runyon’s offense was a valid predicate “crime of violence,” should the Court grant certiorari, vacate the decision below, and remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Taylor ?