No. 25-576

Stephen Buyer v. United States

Lower Court: Second Circuit
Docketed: 2025-11-14
Status: Pending
Type: Paid
Response RequestedResponse Waived Experienced Counsel
Tags: constitutional-limitations criminal-prosecution insider-trading prosecutorial-discretion stock-exchange venue
Key Terms:
Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2025-12-12
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a stock trading on an exchange whose physical headquarters is located in Manhattan suffices to establish venue in the Southern District of New York for insider-trading charges

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

This criminal case involves allegations of insider trading. The Constitution, the U.S. Code, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure all require that a criminal defendant be tried where his crime was (allegedly) committed. In the modern era of electronic trading, trades are no longer executed on physical trading floors, but are instead processed on computer servers that may be located anywhere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has nonetheless doubled down on its outdated precedent holding that a stock exchange’s brick-and-mortar headquarters in Manhattan suffices to establish venue for an insidertrading offense in the Southern District of New York, regardless of where the trades in question actually executed. This rule effectively grants the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York carte blanche to prosecute virtually all insider-trading cases, an outcome fundamentally at odds with the Founders’ “deep and abiding antipathy to letting the government arbitrarily choose a venue in criminal prosecutions.” United States v. Fortenberry , 89 F.4th 702, 712 (9th Cir. 2023). The question presented is whether a stock trading on an exchange whose physical headquarters is located in Manhattan suffices to establish venue in the Southern District of New York for insider-trading charges related to that stock.

Docket Entries

2026-01-29
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including March 9, 2026.
2026-01-28
Motion of United States for an extension of time submitted.
2026-01-28
Motion to extend the time to file a response from February 6, 2026 to March 9, 2026, submitted to The Clerk.
2026-01-16
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including February 6, 2026.
2026-01-14
Motion of United States for an extension of time submitted.
2026-01-14
Motion to extend the time to file a response from January 7, 2026 to February 6, 2026, submitted to The Clerk.
2025-12-08
Response Requested. (Due January 7, 2026)
2025-11-25
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/12/2025.
2025-11-20
Waiver of United States of America of right to respond submitted.
2025-11-20
Waiver of right of respondent United States of America to respond filed.
2025-11-20
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2025-11-10
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 15, 2025)
2025-08-22
Application (25A205) granted by Justice Sotomayor extending the time to file until November 10, 2025.
2025-08-14
Application (25A205) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from September 9, 2025 to November 8, 2025, submitted to Justice Sotomayor.

Attorneys

Stephen Buyer
Daniel Adam RubensOrrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Petitioner
Daniel Adam RubensOrrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Petitioner
Daniel Adam RubensOrrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Petitioner
United States
D. John SauerSolicitor General, Respondent
D. John SauerSolicitor General, Respondent
United States of America
D. John SauerSolicitor General, Respondent