Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to jury instructions on accident and intent in a murder trial

No question identified. : CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 1 (related to COA Claim One) (l)(a) Whether the Sixth Circuit erred by denying a COA on the merits instead of deciding the "threshold inquiry" of whether a Petitioner has raised a genuine constitutional question under the Sixth Amendment, when it claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (a) not objecting to lack of a jury instruction on "accident" and (b) not informing the jury that the State had the burden of proving the victim's injury was not caused unintentionally by "accident"? (1)(b) Whether to decide an issue of IAC on the merits at the COA stage under 2253(c)(2) relying on STRICKLAND is misplaced, and also a violation of Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 at 336337 to decide an appeal without jurisdiction? (l)(c) Whether a defense of may operate in conjunction with a defense of "accident" to excuse an accused's act provided that the victim's death or serious harm was the result of the accused's lawful act of self-defense or defense-of-another, as argued in United States v. Jenkins, 59 MJ. 893 ? II (l)(d) Whether a trial court committed PLAIN ERROR and violated a well-settled due process principle when Petitioner's testimony establishes that a specific instruction (accident in a murder trial) is required (even if no requested by counsel), and if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would not have found the defendant guilty had the instruction of "accident" been given, in conjunction with an instruction on and whether the trial court invaded the province of the jury to determine guilt by failing to give an "accident" instruction "sua sponte"? (l)(e) Whether the Sixth Circuit's selective interpretation of the State court's findings of fact cannot change the fact that Petitioner established a prima facie case of "accident" via her trial testimony, which shifted the to the prosecution to "disprove" a defense of "accident"? (l)(f) Whether a defendant can be convicted of murder after having pled "accident" and WHETHER the Sixth Circuit erred in denying a COA to review the USDC's denial of habeas relief being that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of an essential element of murder, namely, INTENT, to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and WHETHER the Sixth Circuit's decision is in CONFLICT with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (1980, CA5) ? (l)(g) Whether the Sixth Circuit is systematically erring by denying a COA on the merits and failing to explain how courts should square the dictates of Martin at 234 that "the killing will still be excused if the elements of the defense [accident or defense-of-another] are satisfactorily established [and when the State fails to disprove such a negative-defense]" with the uncontested fact that Petitioner testified raising the defense of "accident" and counsel argued "self-defense" and made a but nevertheless, the jury did convict defendant of "assault and felony-murder", meaning, after defendant having pled "accident" and "self-defense" squarely in the context of Martin v. Ohio (1987), 480 U.S. 228 at 234 ("When the prosecution has made out a prima facie case and survives a motion to acquit, the jury may nevertheless not convict if the evidence offered by the defendant raises any reasonable doubt about the existence of any fact necessary for the finding of guilt. Evidence creating a reasonable doubt could easily fall short of proving self-defense [or accident], by a preponderance of the evidence. Of course, if such doubt is not raised in the jury's mind and each juror is convinced that the defendant purposely and with prior calculation and design took life, the killing will still be excused if the elements of the defense are satisfactorily established...") (l)(h ) Whether due process dictates that a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to f